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Abstract Insider attacks are often subtle and slow, or pre-
ceded by behavioral indicators such as organizational rule-
breaking which provide the potential for early warning of
malicious intent; both these cases pose the problem of iden-
tifying attacks from limited evidence contained within a large
volume of event data collected from multiple sources over
a long period. This paper proposes a scalable solution to
this problem by maintaining long-term estimates that indi-
viduals or nodes are attackers, rather than retaining event
data for post-facto analysis. These estimates are then used
as triggers for more detailed investigation. We identify es-
sential attributes of event data, allowing the use of a wide
range of indicators, and show how to apply Bayesian statis-
tics to maintain incremental estimates without global updat-
ing. The paper provides a theoretical account of the process,
a worked example, and a discussion of its practical implica-
tions. The work includes examples that identify subtle attack
behaviour in subverted network nodes, but the process is not
network-specific and is capable of integrating evidence from
other sources, such as behavioral indicators, document ac-
cess logs and financial records, in addition to events identi-
fied by network monitoring.
1 Introduction
Insider attacks pose a particular threat because of the knowl-
edge, access, and authority of their perpetrators (Randazzo
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et al, 2004). Such attacks often involve violations of physi-
cal or operational security, or the misuse of authority; they
may also involve electronic attacks, in which case the ‘elec-
tronic insider’ is as big a threat as a person. It may be safer
for a sophisticated external attacker to subvert an electronic
system, often via social engineering, than directly subvert an
employee.
The literature does not provide a single definition of ‘in-
sider’, which may be defined with respect to physical or log-
ical boundaries, employment, or degree of access to systems
or documents. For the purpose of this work we define an
insider to be someone who:
– Is able to operate within a defined boundary; and
– Is awarded some degree of privilege or trust within that
boundary.
The boundary is an important feature, since we assume
that the first line of defence in most systems - the perime-
ter - does not apply to an insider. The boundary may be a
national boundary, the physical limits of a place of work,
a logical boundary defined by electronic technology, or the
combination of physical and logical boundaries that define
an organization. Perimeter defences that are avoided by in-
siders may include immigration restrictions and constraints
on the import of dangerous goods or materials, physical bar-
riers, access controls and defences against fire and flood, or
electronic mechanisms such as firewalls. Boundaries may be
nested or even overlap; for example an accounts clerk may
be within a financial department within a company. This
does not present a difficulty, since we usually analyze these
entities and their risks separately.
Individuals within a country, organization or system gen-
erally have some degree of authority and some expectation
that they will comply with relevant policies. Within a na-
tion individuals are expected to comply with the law, and
their access to public places and facilities is usually on the
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nization insiders will have some degree of physical access,
and their work will usually involve authorized use of elec-
tronic systems. Examples of security violations by insiders
include ‘home grown’ terrorism, espionage, theft of indus-
trial secrets, sabotage, and employee fraud.
We also include in our definition of insider a person or
element of a system that has been subverted to act for an ex-
ternal attacker, because the detection problem is the same:
the system cannot be protected at the perimeter, and the at-
tacker has acquired some degree of internal authority. Ex-
amples of such attacks include the coercion or social engi-
neering of employees, including using such techniques to
subvert employees’ electronic equipment.
Attacks may involve a single major incident, such as ter-
rorist attack, sabotage, or theft, or may take place over a long
period. For example, the world’s largest credit card fraud
was achieved with a subverted internal system that avoided
discovery for over 17 months (Goodin, 2007).
Subtle attackers are unlikely to launch large-scale fraud-
ulent financial transactions, or use known electronic exploits;
they will seek to avoid any action that can be immediately
identified as an attack. However, they are likely to cause mi-
nor security events: an attacker may test known passwords,
probe for services, or test new exploits, expecting to hide
within the background of user errors, mistakes and other
‘noise’. The problem of detecting such an attacker is there-
fore one of accumulating relatively weak evidence over a
long period. This issue is identified as one of the ‘grand chal-
lenges’ of the internal attacker problem: “to combine events
from one or more sensors, possibly of various types” while
“reduce[ing] data without adversely impacting detection”
(Brackney and Anderson, 2004); it is also a long-standing
problem for Intrusion Detection Systems (see section 3).
This paper provides a solution to this critical problem.
Attackers planning a major incident, or who are predis-
posed to such an action, also generate a trail of subtle clues
before the attack. For example, Band et al (2006) describe
histories of observable rule-breaking, organizational conflict
and behavioral deviance as a precursor to espionage and em-
ployee sabotage. The ability to correlate a series of subtle
clues is potentially as important in identifying the precursor
to a major attack, as it is for detecting attackers who are at-
tempting to stay below alarm thresholds to avoid discovery.
The examples presented here identify subtle attack be-
haviour in subverted network nodes. The actions of the sub-
verted node or individual may be events that could be identi-
fied by an Intrusion Detection System (e.g. network probe),
or they may result from marginal use of a system by an au-
thorized individual, for example failed login attempts or un-
usual patterns of document access. However, the approach to
characterizing and combining diverse sources of weak evi-
dence is equally applicable to other problems in the insider
space, such as identifying criminal or espionage threats from
behavioral indicators, and this is discussed further in section
9.
This paper provides a process for combining evidence
from various sources based on the application of Bayesian
statistics, identifies attributes that must be available to allow
the combination of evidence from different types of sensor,
and demonstrates the effectiveness of this approach with a
simulated slow-attack on a network.
This paper presents the results of substantially more re-
search than its workshop predecessor (Chivers et al, 2009).
Although the principles and aims are the same, the hypoth-
esis on which the updating algorithm is based has been
changed, resulting in a improved updating factor, which
is effective at resolving some marginal discrimination ob-
served in the previous results. This paper also includes a
significantly larger realistic simulation, explicit results on
the limits of evidential accumulation, and a discussion on
normalization that justifies the stance that it is not necessary
to update scores for every individual following each event.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides
an overview of the proposed approach, section 3 describes
related work, and the evidential accumulation process is de-
veloped and described in section 4. After a brief explanation
of the simulation approach in section 5, section 6 shows that
the proposed process is well behaved in simple cases, and
that it gives the same estimate of behaviour regardless of the
size group an individual is associated with; section 7 then
explores the effective limits to updating evidence. Section 8
simulates a challenging insider detection problem, contrasts
the effectiveness of the evidence accumulation process with
a common, but naive, alternative approach, and shows how
the results vary with increasing uncertainty of identification
of nodes that originate events. Section 9 discusses results
and open issues, and the paper is concluded in section 10.
2 Overview
Consider how a human investigator might approach the prob-
lem of accumulating evidence in the system of Figure 1. The
system consists of a network nodes (a...i) with interconnec-
tivity as shown; it may be a social network of people, a net-
work of electronic components, or a hybrid network of indi-
viduals where the links between them are mostly electronic.
Two minor security events are detected x, and y; they may be
behavioral, perhaps originating from observations of deviant
behaviour or abnormal financial statistics, or electronic, for
example alerts from an intrusion detection system, or server
log.
Given information about event x and the traffic in the
network at the time, the investigator may determine that the
nodes most likely to have originated the event are a,b,c,d and
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Fig. 1 Intersecting weak evidence from several events may be enough
to indicate a common source. Event x may have originated from a,b,c,d
or e; event y from f,g or d; their intersection, d, suggests a possible
common factor.
e. Similarly, when y occurs at a much later date the possible
originating nodes are f, g and d. Intersecting these observa-
tions suggests node d as a common factor, and this may be
sufficient to trigger intensive monitoring to determine if it is
behaving maliciously.
The data used to identify these security events and their
possible sources is necessarily transient; it may not be pos-
sible to record sufficient of the history of interactions be-
tween nodes to allow this analysis retrospectively. However,
it is initially sufficient to just identify nodes that score differ-
ently; from the perspective of the defender in the long slow
game it is only necessary to ‘tip off’ a further investigation
by identifying one or more nodes whose behaviour may be
unusual. It is not essential to record the events, the actions
from which they were identified or even the graphs that iden-
tify possible sources, provided it is possible to somehow ac-
cumulate a ‘score’ for each node in the system.
This approach solves one of the critical issues in identi-
fying slow attacks: how to maintain long-term state. Systems
that try to model the behaviour of individuals or protocols
are forced to retain large amounts of data which limits their
scalability. In the approach described here the state size is a
small multiple of the number of nodes in the network; this
state is readily distributed and its storage is feasible, even
for organizations with global networks.
The ‘score’ that we propose for each node is the proba-
bility that the node is subverted, based on the application of
Bayesian statistics. This naturally allows incremental updat-
ing and translation of the problem frame from events which
are related to behaviour to individual attackers. Simpler ap-
proaches, such as the event counting used to introduce this
section, can be shown to be inferior, as demonstrated in sec-
tion 8.
In summary, we propose that to identify subtle or inside
attackers:
– The primary objective is to identify nodes for further in-
vestigation.
– Long-term state is restricted to an incremental estimate
of the probability that each node is an attacker.
– Node estimates are updated following every security
event, taking account of transient network information
that is available at the time of the event.
This process is complementary to conventional intrusion de-
tection using signatures or heuristics, or automated fraud
detection that identifies large deviations in user behaviour.
There is no need to gradually accumulate evidence if the at-
tack is evident, in such a case the secondary investigation is
concerned with incident management, rather than confirma-
tion.
Section 4 describes how scores are calculated and main-
tained, following a brief summary of related work.
3 Related Work
The idea of using primary tests or indicators to identify sus-
pects who then warrant further investigation is an established
financial management practice. Standard texts on fraud man-
agement (e.g. (Wells, 2008)) specify tests that can be used
to trigger further investigation, based on the likelihood that
fraudsters’ behaviour is sufficiently different from that of
normal employees to be statistically significant. For exam-
ple, employees who have an abnormally high level of cash
adjustments (i.e. accounting corrections) may be involved
in systematic sales or invoice fraud. Such systems are sup-
ported by forensic investigation once a fraud is suspected
and statistical triggers are supplemented by checks such as
surprise audits to detect and deter systematic low-level fraud.
Within the computer forensics community Bradford et al
(2004) have proposed a similar process of detection followed
by a more detailed forensic investigation. Users are profiled
according to their function and statistical tests are used to de-
termine if behaviour is anomalous and more intensive data
collection should be initiated. However, the authors do not
show an implementation of their approach and remark that it
could not be carried out for “every user regardless” but itself
requires a “triggering process”.
The problem is the volume of data that must be main-
tained, and this is also an issue with data mining approaches,
which are often proposed as an adjunct to intrusion detec-
tion or audit. Research proposals to alleviate the scalability
issue include improving the quality of the raw data, by dis-
covering better behavioral indicators (Nguyen et al, 2003)
or classifying input features (Chebrolua et al, 2004), the lat-
ter using a Bayesian classifier. An alternative approach by
Staniford et al (2002) is to selectively retain anomalous net-
work data, with the aim of identifying slow network scans.
4Anomalous packets are identified based on heuristics devel-
oped from real scans. Other approaches include statistical
filtering, primarily to reduce false alarm rates and support vi-
sualization (Colombe and Stephens, 2004). In essence, how-
ever, all these approaches require the storage of large vol-
umes of event data for later analysis, and the authors them-
selves identify scalability as a problem (Nguyen et al, 2003).
Aggregation as a means of detecting slow or stealthy at-
tacks has been proposed by Heberlein (2002). His assump-
tion is that slow attacks are still systematic and the attacker
will eventually repeat the attack many times, possibly against
different targets. Alerts are classified and displayed on a
visualization grid, and any persistent activity which raises
alerts of the same type over a long period can be identi-
fied. Although similarly motivated our work differs by accu-
mulating evidence of attackers, not of incidents, removing
the restriction that attackers need to repeat similar attacks.
Heberlein’s algorithm is also a counting process, which we
show to be inferior to statistical reasoning.
Other work directed toward the insider problem is fo-
cussed on characterising an attacker’s behaviour. The se-
curity indicators (‘events’) used may range from an indi-
vidual’s buying and travel preferences, to electronic alerts.
For example, Buford et al (2008) propose a comprehensive
framework of ‘observables’ that are used to build a model of
individuals’ behaviour via graph theory. Eberle and Holder
(2009) develop graphs of behavioral events, such as phone
calls, to identify sub-graphs of normal behaviour, which are
used to search for similar but anomalous occurrences. These
approaches offer the advantage of modeling the potential at-
tacker and providing interesting insights into observable be-
haviour; however, their application may be limited by the
computational cost of graph matching over large datasets,
as well as by data scalability.
Most of the work described above is still formative; net-
work intrusion detection, however, is established in the lit-
erature and supported by both open and propriety products
(Bace and Mell, 2001). An intrusion detection system (IDS)
uses a behavioral model of a system or protocol and detects
anomalous events by either recognizing predefined signa-
tures, or by heuristics. Both approaches have strengths and
weaknesses, but despite the use of IDSs in practice they are
hampered by a lack of scalability and tend to generate large
numbers of false positive alerts (Bace and Mell, 2001). From
the perspective of this paper, IDSs are an effective way of
generating events which may indicate an attack but are un-
able to maintain sufficient state to identify slow attacks.
An IDS is not the only possible source of security events;
other sources include the behavioral events referenced above,
operating system audit trails, document access records, and
even Honeypots (Spitzner, 2003), which are security traps
with no operational functionality.
In summary, the challenge of integrating information
from many sources in a manageable and scalable fashion,
in order to identify patient internal attackers, is still an im-
portant open question (Brackney and Anderson, 2004).
4 Accumulating Evidence
This section develops the detailed theory necessary to im-
plement the method outlined in section 2: to collapse the
problem of attacker identification to updating a single score
for each network node or user. The section first outlines the
evidential scenario and the attributes required to character-
ize security events. Standard Bayesian updating is summa-
rized, followed by the development of the process for updat-
ing evidence of insider attacks. Finally, the practical issue of
relating this process to real security events is discussed.
Definitions
Node: This paper uses network terminology, without loss
of generality to broader types of human or attack behav-
ior. A node is an individual or a system element such
as a user’s end system or a router. This theory does
not require a graph to accumulate evidence, so edges
between nodes are not formally defined. The edges or
links between nodes may, however, be needed to estab-
lish which nodes are the possible originators of security
events; examples of such links include network commu-
nications, indirect communication between individuals
(e.g via emails or documents), and direct social interac-
tion.
Event: An event is an alert that indicates a possible security
violation; it may be an anomalous phone call, a financial
anomaly, a failed system login, or something more cer-
tain, such as a known electronic exploit.
The evidential scenario is presented in Figure 2. Node a is
an individual or network node, and x is an event which is
detected somewhere in the system; there is some evidence
that identifies the nodes that may have originated the event.
Event x may indicate an attack. Some security events are
almost certainly attacks; however, there are many more that
may be user mistakes, network backscatter, or other forms
of ‘noise’. For example, an attempt by a user to obtain a re-
stricted document, or connect to a non-existent webserver,
may be a simple mistake but could also be a deliberate at-
tempt operate outside their legitimate authority.
In addition to uncertainty about the extent that an event
originates because of an attack, there may also be uncer-
tainty about the origin of the event. For example, a subverted
network node may be able to spoof its network address, or
the event may only be traceable to a subnetwork; in a behav-
ioral context only a proportion of the individuals associated
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Fig. 2 The Evidential Scenario: events are detected that may indicate
an attack, it is possible to identify some nodes as possible originators
of each event, and the objective is to investigate the hypothesis that a
particular node is the attacker.
with a particular event (behavioral indicator) may be identi-
fiable, for example, it may be able to identify most of the in-
dividuals with access to a ’leaked’ classified document, but
only estimate the total number who may have had access. In
order to accumulate evidence from a wide range of different
sources, events must be characterized by uniform parame-
ters that describe these various attributes. We propose that
security events can be characterized by three parameters:
– P(Attackx): the probability that a particular event, x, is
caused by an intentioned attack.
For an event generated by network intrusion sensors this
is the ratio of true positive alerts to all alerts, which
is a standard figure of merit. For behavioral indicators
(e.g. presence at a street demonstration) and other sys-
tem alerts (e.g. failed logins) it is necessary to estimate
the value based on likely event frequencies. In some cases
the historical rate of occurrence of certain attacks, such
as insider fraud, may be known, and this may be used to
estimate the probability that certain events derive from
such attacks. In a similar way to estimating risk likeli-
hoods, it may be sufficient to quantify these frequencies
to an accuracy of an order of magnitude.
– Cx: the Causal Node Set, which is the set of nodes or
individuals that are estimated to be the possible source
of the event.
In a network it may be possible to associate the event
with a packet stream that originated from an identifi-
able subnetwork or node. This may be a static feature
of the sensor’s location, or it may be deduced from the
data (the packet source address places it in a particular
subnetwork), or from dynamic system information (e.g.
current routing tables). In the case of behavioral infor-
mation it is likely to be an identifiable set of individuals
(e.g. visitors to an internet cafe during a specific period).
– P(Cx): the probability that the event originator is within
the causal node set.
It will not always be possible to identify with certainty
the set of nodes or individuals that include the event
originator: the estimate may be incomplete, or wrong.
For example: technical means such as indirection or ad-
dress spoofing (CERT Incident Note, 1998) may be used
to camouflage the source of an attack; routing tables or
traffic records may suggest that most packets came from
a specific network, but a few came from elsewhere; the
traceability of a packet to a particular subnetwork may
depend on the correct functioning of routers and fire-
walls, which themselves have a non-zero possibility of
being subverted. In the case of behavioral indicators it
may be possible to know the number of people involved
in an event, but only positively identify a fraction of the
individuals; for example, not all the visitors to an In-
ternet Cafe during a period in question are positively
identified. All these factors suggest the need for a metric
that quantifies the extent to which the event originator is
known to be within the estimated causal set.
Given a sequence of events characterized by these pa-
rameters, we wish to investigate the hypothesis that a partic-
ular node is subverted, or acting as the agent of an attacker.
We will first summarize the standard approach to Bayesian
updating, then show how it can be applied in this case.
4.1 Bayesian updating
Bayesian updating provides an estimate of the probability
that hypothesis H is true, given an event, x.
P(H|x) = P(x|H) ·P(H)
P(x)
(1)
This theorem uses P(x|H), the probability of event (x)
given that the hypothesis is true, to update the initial (‘prior’)
estimate of the probability that the hypothesis is true, P(H).
Simple updating of this type is used in medical diagnosis;
given knowledge of the probability of a symptom (the event)
given a disease (the hypothesis), it provides a principled es-
timate of the likelihood of the disease given the symptom. It
is essentially this change of reference frame – from symp-
tom to cause – that is needed to identify attackers from their
behaviour.
The denominator P(x) is the probability of the event
and in many cases, including ours, is difficult to estimate.
However, standard results in Bayesian statistics (Russell and
Norvig, 2010) show that this can be replaced by a normaliz-
ing factor chosen to ensure that the probabilities of all possi-
ble hypotheses sum to unity. The problem of how to achieve
this normalization in the case of a distributed system is dis-
cussed in section 4.2.2, below.
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ability of an event is conditioned by the hypothesis, but not
by other events that are observed), a further standard result
is that the evidence updates from several events (e.g. x,y) are
combined as follows:
P(H|x,y) = P(x|H) ·P(y|H) ·P(H)
N
(2)
Where N is a normalizing factor, as described above.
4.2 Combining evidence from security events
The evidential scenario at the start of this section defines
three key parameters: P(Attackx), Cx, and P(Cx) which char-
acterize an event; in addition, we define the following:
S The set of all nodes in the system.
#S The total number of nodes in the system.
a,b... Particular network nodes. a,b, ... ∈ S
Ha The hypothesis that we wish to update: that
node (a) is the node which is subverted, or
being used to mount an attack within the sys-
tem.
x,y... Particular events that may provide evidence
of an attack.
#Cx The number of nodes in set Cx
The hypothesis, Ha, assumes that only one node in the sys-
tem is subverted; this provides improved discrimination and
normalization over the alternative hypothesis that several
nodes may be subverted. This is a technical issue and does
not inhibit the practical use of the resulting scores to identify
several attackers. In practice the several-attacker problem
can be regraded informally as superposition, and we later
illustrate with an example that attackers with high levels of
activity do not mask more subtle attacks.
In order to carry out Bayesian updating as specified in
equation (2), it is necessary to calculate the update factor
P(x|Ha), the prior probability P(Ha), and when required to
normalize the result in such a way that the probabilities
across all nodes sum to unity.
4.2.1 The Bayesian update factor
The update factor P(x|Ha) is the likelihood of the event,
given the hypothesis Ha. Given that event x has been ob-
served, and the hypothesis that a is the only attacker, then
either:
– Event x originates because of an attack, and it came from
node a, or
– Event x did not originate because of an attack, and it may
have originated from any node.
The probability that x originates because of an attack is
the parameter P(Attackx) that characterizes the event, as de-
scribed above. The probability that the event did not origi-
nate because of an attack (i.e. it is a false positive) is there-
fore (1 - P(Attackx)).
Each event is associated with a set of nodes or individu-
als, Cx, that is expected to include the originator of the event;
we assume that each member of this set has an equal prob-
ability of being the event originator. It would be relatively
straightforward to extend the theory below to assign likeli-
hoods individually to members of Cx; however, we have yet
to find evidence that such a distinction would be useful in
practical event scenarios.
This set divides the population of nodes in the system
into two groups; node a, the subject of the hypothesis, may
be a member of Cx or may fall outside that set. If a is in Cx
then the probability that x originated from a is the probabil-
ity that Cx includes the originating node, P(Cx), divided by
the number of nodes in the set, #Cx. If a is not in Cx then the
probability that x originated from a is (1 - P(Cx)) divided by
the number of nodes outside Cx, (#S - #Cx).
This allows us to calculate the probability that x orig-
inates because of an attack, and it came from node a. As
described above, we must add the possibility that x did not
originate because of an attack to obtain the required update
factor:
i f a ∈Cx :
P(x|Ha) = P(Attackx) ·P(Cx)#Cx +(1−P(Attackx)) (3)
i f a /∈Cx :
P(x|Ha) = P(Attackx) · (1−P(Cx))#S−#Cx +(1−P(Attackx))(4)
These equations provide the Bayesian update factors; in
order to complete equation (2) it is also necessary to include
prior probabilities and normalize the result.
4.2.2 Normalizing the result and localizing the update
factor
By multiplying the prior probability for each node, P(Ha),
with the sequence of update factors derived from events it
is possible to calculate the numerator of equation (2), which
provides a score for each node in the system. The prior prob-
ability is a function of the network node, and may be esti-
mated in advance for the type of node, or if there is no basis
for distinguishing nodes (see section 4.3, below), it can be
set to 1/#S. The resulting score after two events, x and y, is:
Scorea = P(x|Ha) ·P(y|Ha) ·P(Ha) (5)
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ability of each hypothesis given the evidence it is necessary
to normalize the results such that the sum of the probabili-
ties over all possible hypotheses is unity. The working hy-
pothesis that there is a single attacker makes this straightfor-
ward assuming that nodes in the system are disjoint, since
it results in a single hypothesis for every node in the sys-
tem, giving a normalisation factor which is the sum of these
scores:
P(Ha|x,y) = Scorea∑i∈S Scorei
(6)
This allows probabilities to be recovered from node
scores when required, but it does not meet the need for effi-
cient evidence recording, since the updates in equations (3)
and (4) require the probability estimate associated with ev-
ery node to be updated for each event. For efficiency, and to
allow distributed calculation, it is very desirable to update
only the estimates of nodes that are within Cx - that is to up-
date only the scores of nodes that are indicated as possible
originators of a particular event.
It is therefore desirable to localize the updating process;
to do this we observe that multiplying all the update fac-
tors arising from a given event by a constant has no effect
on the normalized probability. This is trivial to prove: mul-
tiply P(x|Hi) in equation (5) by an arbitrary constant, K, for
all nodes i in S. This multiplies both the numerator and the
denominator of equation (6) by K, which cancel to give the
same normalized probability that would result if the constant
multiplier had not been used.
Our objective is to avoid updating node scores outside
Cx, and this can therefore be achieved by choosing a con-
stant K which sets the update factor for these nodes to unity.
The required constant is the reciprocal of equation (4); by
multiplying equation (3) by this factor we obtain an update
factor that is applied to only the scores of those nodes within
Cx.
∆x =
P(Attackx)·P(Cx)
#Cx
+(1−P(Attackx))
P(Attackx)·(1−P(Cx))
#S−#Cx +(1−P(Attackx))
(7)
4.3 Evidence accumulation in practice
The forgoing sections provide the necessary theory to allow
the details of security events to be discarded, while retaining
a single score for each node which summarizes the evidence
that the node is an attacker. The algorithm to achieve this is:
1. Initialize each node score with its prior probability, P(Ha).
2. For each security event:
(a) Establish the distinguishing parameters: the proba-
bility that the event originates because of an attack,
the set of nodes that are likely to have originated the
event (Cx), and the probability that Cx contains the
event originator.
(b) Calculate ∆ from equation (7).
(c) Multiply the score for each node in Cx by ∆ ; do not
update the scores for nodes outside Cx.
3. When required, normalize the resulting node scores us-
ing equation (6), to obtain the probability that each node
is an attacker.
The prior probability is of value if different nodes
have significantly different priors. For example, in a net-
work there will be a significant difference between a well-
configured router and a laptop which is used outside the or-
ganizational perimeter; for individuals the prior probabili-
ties may vary with degree of background checking, or in the
case of large public populations with factors such as social-
economic group. In many cases where the priors are signif-
icant they can be estimated from survey information; if no
such information is available, then the priors can be set to
1/#S.
The three parameters that characterize an event were dis-
cussed in the introduction to section 4.
The assumption of event independence (see 4.1) has prac-
tical consequences for the choice of event. For example, in
a network attack, a particular sequence of actions may be
closely related (e.g. a known exploit, followed by an outgo-
ing connection that downloads specific malicious software).
Such chains of actions are clearly not independent events,
but are close enough in time to be correlated by an intrusion
system and regarded as a single event with a high certainty
that it is an attack. On the other hand, in a network scan,
which is a series of probes to different network locations, the
individual probes are only interdependent to the extent that
addresses scanned will depend to some extent on past his-
tory. In these situations the designer has a choice whether to
regard them as a separate events, with rather low P(Attack),
or if they occur within a short time interval to regard them
as a single event with a much higher P(Attack).
We are primarily concerned with comparative scores in
order to identify nodes that are distinctive and require further
investigation. In practice, then, it is sufficient to use Loga-
rithmic scores, simply adding Log(∆ ) to each node indicated
by an event. Equation (6) can still be reconstructed from this
information, but more usually the highest node score or set
of scores is chosen for further investigation.
The reader may be wondering about the value of calcu-
lating ∆ at all at this stage, since we simply add its loga-
rithm to the score for indicated nodes. However, this differs
significantly from a counting algorithm, where the score for
each node is incremented when it is identified as the possible
source of a security event. The update value, ∆ , character-
8izes exactly how much evidence is provided by each event.
This important distinction is illustrated in the worked exam-
ple presented in section 8.
5 Simulation Approach
The sections that follow evaluate the evidence accumula-
tion process described above, partly by further exploration
of equation (7), and partly by simulation. This section briefly
describes the simulation rationale and approach.
It is rare to obtain useful network traces from real sys-
tems, especially large systems with subtle attackers. There-
fore, in order to explore a wide range of different scenarios,
we use network simulation. In this paper, simulation is first
used to demonstrate properties of the proposed evidence ac-
cumulation process, then used to demonstrate its effective-
ness in a complex network whose overall structure is typical
of those we encounter in practice.
The structure of the simulator is presented in fig 3.
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EventDetection
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Traffic
Generator
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Manager
Normaliser
& Readout
Scores
Output
Calculation
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Simulator
Problem
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Fig. 3 The structure of the security event simulator. The modularity
allows the direct substitution of calculation methods for comparative
testing under identical conditions.
The simulator behaviour is controlled by two inputs: a
problem specification and a test method. The problem spec-
ification contains two main parts, a description of network
traffic including security related events, and a specification
for how event detection behaves. Traffic is generated by the
simulator at random, within rates set by the specification,
and can be typed to allow different sorts of detectors and
traffic to be simulated simultaneously. The event detection
section specifies what traffic events can be detected, and how
to determine the three key parameters: P(Attackx), Cx, and
P(Cx) for each event.
The test method provides score calculation and normal-
ization functions. Usually these functions implement equa-
tions (7) and (6) respectively, but they can be exchanged
with other methods, allowing exactly comparable results to
be obtained; this feature is used to contrast the updating pro-
cess proposed here with a counting approach in section 8.2,
below.
The simulator maintains separation between the calcu-
lation method and problem specification. It generates traffic
according to the activity specification, which is then screened
for events using the rule structure provided by the event de-
tection specification. Events detected are provided to the cal-
culation method, which updates the associated scores, and
when output is required the normalizer can be employed to
recover actual probabilities. In all the examples in this paper
the normalizer is not used, since Log scores are displayed,
as described in section 4.3.
6 Behaviour of Evidential Accumulation
Before showing a representatively difficult example of in-
sider attack in which the attacker attempts to hide below the
background noise of the system detection (see section 8.1),
this section explores if the evidential accumulation process
is well-behaved in simpler cases. Two examples are given,
the first explores a simple electronic network with variable
rate attackers, and the second is concerned with a social net-
work with multiple overlapping groups of individuals.
6.1 A simple network
Given a single subnetwork, in which the sender can be read-
ily identified, we explore some key questions for evidence
accumulation:
– Is it possible to identify an attacker sending at a slightly
higher rate than the background of errors from normal
nodes?
– If the rate of attack increases, is the process stable, and
does it enable the attackers to be identified earlier?
– Does the process accommodate multiple attackers with
different rates of attack (i.e. can one node hide behind
another’s attack)?
We simulate a small network of 50 nodes, in which the
originating node of an event can be identified with certainty
(i.e. #Cx = 1, and P(Cx) = 1); we assign P(Attack) an ar-
bitrary probability of 1/12. (The only special feature in this
9choice was to avoid a number that exactly divided the sys-
tem topology; we are not aware of any simplification that
would result from such a choice, but wished to avoid the
possibility.) Time is divided into slots (e.g. single minutes)
and the average background rate of random innocent events
that may be misinterpreted as attacks is 1/50 per node – in
other words, one event per minute. Three nodes within the
network are designated attackers, and they generate random
attacks at rates of 2, 4 and 8 times the total background rate.
Because these parameters identify the originator of an
event with certainty, then there is less opportunity for an at-
tacker to hide in the ’noise’ of a crowd; this experiment is
designed to illustrate that several attackers are treated inde-
pendently and that discrimination, or time to detection, im-
proves with higher event rates.
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Fig. 4 Scores resulting from three attackers at different rates in a small
network. The presence of high rate events from one or more attackers
does not interfere with the detection of lower-rate attacks from another.
The scores resulting from this scenario are shown in Fig.
4. All three attacking nodes are well distinguished from the
background level of events, which is indicated by the ‘con-
trol’ result, which is the score for a typical innocent node.
As would be expected, if the attack rate is higher the dis-
crimination improves. The accumulation of evidence is well
behaved and the higher rate nodes do not interfere with the
accumulation of evidence relating to attackers operating at a
lower rate.
6.2 Evidence from overlapping groups of individuals
Electronic networks are likely to have stable structures, re-
sulting in relatively simple and consistent groups of nodes
(i.e. the sets of Cx) that can be identified as the originator of
an event: for example the individual node, the logical sub-
network, or a local facility network. Under these circum-
stances it is important that the same evidence is accumulated
against two nodes whose behaviour is the same, but who are
usually identified with different size groups of nodes.
This issue becomes more significant when dealing with
social networks where innocent individuals associated with
’events’ (e.g. individuals visiting a specific internet cafe, or
taking a flight to a particular destination) are present by ac-
cident, rather than a result of a fixed network architecture.
These groups of individuals are much more ad-hoc, and the
attackers lie somewhere in their many random intersections.
The problem of ’false alarms’ occurs equally in the be-
havioral modeling of individuals as in the electronic moni-
toring of systems or networks. Most of the security breaches
recorded by government agencies, integrity lapses recorded
by police services, and disciplinary offences noted by com-
panies are false alarms, in the sense that they do not neces-
sarily indicate that the individual is a potential spy, is cor-
rupt, or is unsuitable as an employee.
To investigate how well such disparate groups can be as-
sessed we simulate three events that identify three radically
different sized groups of individuals (651, 51 and 25). Fig.
5 (a) illustrates the resulting sets of individuals, and the size
of two overlaps. All the individuals in the system generate
events at the same rate (P(event)=0.014), which results in
a total of 10 events per unit of time from the 700 individu-
als). The exceptions are the individuals in the overlaps, who
generate events in all the groups with which they are iden-
tified at the same rate as other group members, so they gen-
erate additional events pro-rata to their group memberships.
P(Attack) is .099 for all events, and the simulation was run
for 100,000 time units. The resulting scores are given in Fig.
5 (b).
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24
25 25
Group A
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GroupB (51)
Group C (25)
28.5
42.7
Membership Scores
a. b.
Fig. 5 Investigating the scores for individuals in different size groups,
with the same behaviour within each group. (a) shows the sizes of the
three groups and their overlaps; (b) gives the final accumulated score
for representative single individuals. This demonstrates that scores de-
pend on activity level, and are independent of group size.
The results show that individuals generating ‘false
alarms’ at the same rate, but ascribed by the detection pro-
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cess to different sized groups, receive the same score; the
small differences are attributed only to small differences
in the random generation of events. This normalization be-
tween different group sizes is important because the objec-
tive is to identify individual behaviour and avoid identifying
individuals simply on the basis of the groups to which they
are ascribed. Section 8.2, below, provides a dramatic exam-
ple of how badly alternative processes perform if they do not
possess this attribute.
In this case the scores for the individuals in the inter-
section of these groups is predictable, as it arises simply
from the superposition of event rates. The reader should bear
in mind that this section is concerned only with basic be-
haviour. A real social network problem is likely to iden-
tify many more groups, with considerable uncertainty about
their membership, making it rather more difficult to identify
which individuals are potentially significant.
7 Limiting factors for Event Evidence
The equation for updating evidence can also be used as a
measure of effectiveness for event detectors. Specifically, we
can enquire under what circumstances does an event add in-
formation to our estimate that an individual is an attacker.
The threshold of usefulness of event detection occurs
when ∆ from equation (7) is unity; a value above unity adds
evidence to some hypothesis, below reduces evidence against
any of the identified nodes. We require:
P(Attackx)·P(Cx)
#Cx
+(1−P(Attackx))
P(Attackx)·(1−P(Cx))
#S−#Cx +(1−P(Attackx))
>= 1 (8)
Multiplying by the denominator of the left hand side, then
subtracting (1−P(Attackx)) from both sides gives:
P(Attackx) ·P(Cx)
#Cx
>=
P(Attackx) · (1−P(Cx))
#S−#Cx (9)
Dividing out P(Attackx), and multiplying out the denomina-
tors, we obtain:
(#S−#Cx) ·P(Cx)>= #Cx · (1−P(Cx)) (10)
Adding #Cx ·P(Cx) to both sides, then re-arranging, gives:
#S >=
#Cx
P(Cx)
(11)
This result is valid provided P(Attackx) is not zero. Val-
ues of P(Attackx) close to unity provide most evidence, and
as P(Attackx) tends toward zero the update factor approaches
unity, which is to be expected since the weight of evidence
is reducing.
Assuming that P(Attackx) is not approaching zero, then
this limit can be regarded as the point at which the whole
population is implicated by an event. A practical illustration
of this threshold is given in section 8.3, which shows how
evidence in a representative network behaves with decreas-
ing certainty of event attribution.
A special case of this result is if #Cx = #S; if an event
can only be ascribed to all the nodes in the system, then it
does not provide evidence that discriminates between nodes.
Alternatively, this limit can be expressed as a ratio be-
tween the size of the system and the number of nodes identi-
fied as possible originators, compared to the probability that
the originator is within these nodes, as shown in Fig. 6.
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Fig. 6 Evidential value is limited by the effective size of the set of
individuals that may have originated an event
8 Insider Attacks
This section shows that a subtle insider attack in a represen-
tative network can be identified by the proposed evidence
accumulation process, contrasts the principled accumulation
of evidence with a simple counting scheme, and explores
how evidential accumulation behaves as the attribution of
nodes that originate events becomes less certain. All the ex-
amples in this section use the same network and the same
simulation seeds, to provide comparable results.
8.1 A difficult detection problem
The network used in this section is a medium-sized system
(3000 endpoints) with features that are representative of the
problem space, including:
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– Sensors with different capabilities; for example, certainty
of detection and ability to identify source nodes.
– Attackers whose rate of attack is significantly below the
background rate of false positive alerts for the system.
– Attacks that employ address spoofing.
An important practical issue is the estimation of the three
parameters that characterize a security event; relating these
to actual systems and assessing the need for accuracy is sub-
ject to ongoing study. To date it has been possible to achieve
realistic results by assigning P(Attack) as a fixed value for a
given sensor within a deployment context, and by creating
a simple rule-set that maps the network connection associ-
ated with an event to a set of nodes, giving Cx and P(Cx)
depending on the configuration and protocol.
The network used in this example is given in Fig. 7.
This network has 3000 nodes, most of which are user sys-
tems located in eleven separate client subnetworks in sizes
that range from 33 to 500 nodes. Two of these subnetworks
have nodes that are subverted and are attacking the sys-
tem. The purpose of dividing the clients into several sub-
networks (apart from the fact that this is a standard config-
uration) is to contrast the detectability of attackers in dif-
ferent sized subnetworks, given that in many cases it will
be possible to identify only the subnetwork from which an
attack originated. This arrangement allows us to investi-
gate the scores accrued for an attack node (3 or 403) ver-
sus normally-behaving nodes in the same subnetwork, and
nodes in a control subnetwork which is larger (hence higher
false alarm rate) but has no attackers.
Most of the traffic in the system is between the clients
and servers via the core network. Router and firewall detail
is not shown, and because the object is to investigate evi-
dence accumulation rather than event generation we model
two unspecified types of security event: those that can be
detected within client subnetworks, and events in the server
farm. For example, an event could be an attempt to connect
to an exploitable network port.
Attackers are expected to generate security events at a
rate that is much lower than the background rate of ‘mis-
takes’ by normal clients, in order to remain undetected. In
the simulation below time is measured in arbitrary clocks
(e.g. minutes), and the probability of a normal client gen-
erating a security alert in any time slot is 1/20; in other
words the system suffers an average of 150 false alarms ev-
ery minute. In contrast, attackers generate events at a rate of
1/10; one event every 10 minutes.
In addition to the low attack rate, to further avoid de-
tection, attackers use address spoofing. Events detected out-
side the subnetwork containing the attacker can only be
assigned to the whole subnetwork. Only events identified
within the subnetwork containing the attacker (i.e. directed
toward nodes within that subnetwork) can be traced to a spe-
cific node.
An outline calculation illustrates the difficulty of this
problem. Consider the attacker at node 3. Viewed from out-
side, the subnetwork can be expected to generate innocent
background events (false alarms) at a rate of 1.6 events per
minute (33 ∗ 1/20). The events generated by the attacker
are distributed at random across the network, so of these,
33/3000 are towards the attacker’s own subnetwork; these
are the only events that can be identified to a particular at-
tacker, and they occur at a rate of one every 909 minutes
(P(Attack that can be assigned to a specific node)=1/10 *
33/3000).
The simulation is over 104 minutes; in this time we ex-
pect a total of 1.5 million events in the system as whole
(104 ∗ 33/20) of which 16000 (104 ∗ 1.6) can be ascribed
to the attacker’s subnetwork, and just 11 (104/909) to the
attack node.
Given this information the reader could devise a solution
to identify the attacker, but the problem addressed here is
how to use all the available information when the location of
the attacker and the traffic patterns are unknown in advance.
In summary, the event parameters used in the simulation
are:
Cx contains all the nodes in the source subnetwork, unless
the destination of the network message that caused the
event is in the same subnetwork as the source, in which
case Cx contains just the source node.
P(Cx) is set to unity, since Cx includes the node which orig-
inates the traffic. (The effect of varying this parameter is
discussed in section 8.3, below.)
P(Attackx) is set to 0.043 for all used locations except the
server nodes, for which a value of 0.0099 is assigned,
and events from a client to its own subnetwork, which
are given a value of 0.076.
These are arbitrary, for the sake of demonstration, al-
though they do reflect likely differences in expectation.
For example, it seems plausible that an incident at a loca-
tion to which most of the traffic is directed is less likely
to originate from an attack, but in practice that is de-
pendent on the actual event. The only special feature in
the choice of value is avoiding fractions such as 30/3000
that match the system topology, although we have not
detected any problems arising from such choices. Vary-
ing these parameters results in different scores, but not
at the expense of overall discrimination.
The network simulator was used to generate random traf-
fic as specified above, and the scores for the resulting se-
curity events were accumulated as described in section 4.3.
The results are shown in Fig. 8.
Fig. 8 shows node scores as they are accumulated. The
nodes shown are attackers (3 and 403), representative nodes
in the same subnetworks (4 and 404), and a node in a large
control subnetwork with no attackers (1000). Nodes 3 and 4
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Fig. 7 The Test Network: a common configuration with a server farm and many client sub-networks communicating over a network core. Different
size sub-networks are shown for test purposes.
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Fig. 8 Network Simulation Results; attackers are clearly distinguished
from background noise.
are from 33-node subnetworks, nodes 403 and 404 are from
100-node subnetworks, and node 1000 is from a 500 node
subnetwork, of which there are four, which together contain
a significant proportion of the nodes in the network.
The results show that insider attacks can be clearly dis-
tinguished from background noise in the system.
For each size of subnetwork the proposed scoring clearly
distinguishes the attacker as an individual from other nodes
within the same subnetwork. Nodes are similarly scored re-
gardless of the size of the subnetwork in which they reside,
and there there is only a small difference in score between
other nodes in the subnetworks containing attackers and the
control node (approximately 2%), which can be attributed to
attackers slightly raising the score of their own network.
8.2 Contrasting evidence accumulation with event counting
The effectiveness of the approach presented in this paper can
be judged by comparison to the counting algorithm used to
introduce section 4, and adopted by some researchers. The
same events are generated with the same characteristics as
described in the previous section, but the calculation func-
tion uses counting rather than evidence accumulation, by
simply incrementing node scores if the node is identified as
a possible source of an event (i.e. is in Cx). The results are
presented in in Fig. 9.
On a realistic problem, the counting approach fails in
almost every respect. Attackers are not distinguished from
other nodes in their subnetwork. Instead, the primary dis-
tinction is between nodes on the basis of network size; es-
sentially the larger subnetworks generate more background
traffic, so receive a proportionately higher score.
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Fig. 9 Counting Algorithm Performance on the same problem; it fails
to identify attackers, and scores are proportional to background noise
which is related to sub-network size.
8.3 Uncertainty in identifying the nodes that originate an
event
The network example, above, assumed that the set of nodes
that may have originated an event could be identified with
certainty. Fig. 10 shows the results of a series of simula-
tions with varying degree of certainty of attribution of the
nodes that originate each event. For the sake of illustration
all events were given the same P(Cx); in practice this would
vary depending on the type of the event and the position in
the network where it was detected.
As would be expected, the greater the uncertainty the
lower the overall score. Importantly, the scores remain cor-
rectly ordered; even with high degrees of uncertainty of at-
tribution, attacking nodes would be correctly identified for
further investigation.
A noteworthy feature of this simulation is the node in
the control subnetwork, whose score decreases more quickly
than the others, eventually becoming negative. Section 7
showed that the limit of evidential value of an event is
the point where the degree of uncertainty encompasses the
whole network. The control node in this case is in a subnet-
work of 500 nodes; in a network with 3000 nodes equation
(11) gives the threshold value as P(Cx) = 500/3000 = 0.17,
which is consistent with the point at which the simulated
score is zero.
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Fig. 10 The variation in final scores of the network simulation with
P(Cx); uncertainty in identifying the source of events predicably weak-
ens the score, but the attackers remain identifiable.
The decreasing score of the control node in this exam-
ple therefore occurs because the attribution of events to that
node is approaching the limit of evidential value. This ef-
fect is the most likely cause of the small divergence between
non-attacker nodes (subnet 400 diverges a little); however,
given the random nature of the simulation this difference is
too small to justify a claim of significance.
In summary, this section illustrates that even given in-
creasing uncertainty about the origin of the events it remains
possible to distinguish attackers from other nodes; however,
the limits derived in section 7 apply if the uncertainty of at-
tribution of the event originator approaches the size of the
system.
9 Discussion
The proposed evidential updating process is effective be-
cause it relates event evidence to the hypothesis that a node
or individual is the attacker. The change of reference frame
from events to individuals allows event data to be discarded,
while retaining the weight of evidence for attackers. The
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process scales linearly with the number of nodes or indi-
viduals in the system, and is applicable to a very wide range
of systems and circumstances.
Bayesian statistics has been used, rather than the sim-
ple probability ratios that would be suggested if informa-
tion theory was employed, in order to effect the change of
viewpoint from the event to the attacker. The update factor,
∆ , importantly takes account of ancillary information such
as the number of nodes that are indicated by the event and
the degree of certainty in their estimation. These event pa-
rameters are not specific to any particular type of event and
the statistical approach given here is equally generic; in par-
ticular it avoids the need for Bayesian networks tuned for
specific problems by subject matter experts, as proposed by
some researchers (Caputo et al, 2009).
∆ can be used as a figure of merit for sources of infor-
mation: if ∆ is consistently fractional for a sensor, then the
resulting events will degrade the quantity of available infor-
mation, rather than improve it. We show that this depends on
the uncertainty of estimation of the set of event originators,
compared with the size of the overall system. Essentially, if
it is not possible to distinguish a set of possible event orig-
inators from the other individuals in the system, then the
event adds no value. This has practical consequences for in-
trusion systems and network design where such uncertainty
is likely to occur: as much attention should be given to iden-
tifying the source of events as to the false-alarm rates of sen-
sors.
The attributes described in section 4 (probability of at-
tack, P(Attackx), the likely originating nodes of an event,
Cx, and the probability that the event originator is in this set,
P(Cx)) are not specific to any particular type of event detec-
tor and can be applied at different levels of abstraction, if
necessary within the same system. As described in the in-
troduction, this approach is intended to apply to a mixture
of event types including both behavioral and network indi-
cators. However, different types of events will change the
speed with which attackers are discriminated. The network
scenario presented here was designed to be a difficult detec-
tion problem: it has a low attack rate compared with back-
ground noise, for most events the originator could not be
uniquely identified, and events were not known to be attacks
with certainty. In other words, all three parameters that char-
acterize an event were uncertain, inevitably resulting in a
long discrimination time. In practice the detection speed will
vary depending upon the available information. For exam-
ple, behavioral events such as organizational rule-breaking
will be uniquely identified with a particular individual, while
there may be uncertainty if this indicates a potential attacker;
in other cases, such as terrorist use of an Internet cafe, it may
be certain that a user during a certain period is an active ter-
rorist, but there may be uncertainty related to identification.
In practice, therefore, different strengths of evidence will be
found, and these will inevitably result in different detection
periods.
The example in section 6.2 illustrates a problem in be-
havioral modeling that is less common in networks. How-
ever, it is worth noting a specific problem with purely be-
havioral events which make more substantial empirical ex-
amples difficult to generate: the problem of giving plausi-
ble values for P(Attackx). In many circumstances it is pos-
sible to measure background levels of user behaviour; for
example, document access, Internet use and financial ac-
counting deviations are usually recorded, and false alarm
rates are a standard metric for intrusion detection sensors.
Unfortunately, relevant background levels of minor deviant
behaviours, such as organizational rule-breaking or disci-
plinary offences, are undocumented for populations of in-
terest. Case histories suggest that insiders who attack their
systems for profit or revenge often have a history of such be-
haviour. Herbig and Wiskoff (2002) record that within 150
espionage cases, 80% were observed to exhibit behaviours
that violate criteria in the guidelines for eligibility for access
to classified information. For example, the spy Ames had a
series of security violations, alcohol problems, and an unex-
plained lavish lifestyle. This would certainly provide a rich
source of behavioral indicators with no doubt about the in-
dividual to whom they relate; unfortunately, the underlying
level of such behaviours in the relevant population is un-
known. These case studies provide powerful anecdotal evi-
dence that behavioral histories are significant, but before any
data-analytic approach can be applied in such cases it will
be necessary to establish the underlying behavioral norms
in populations of concern.
The discussion in section 7 gives one limit to this method:
events that do not distinguish between individuals do not
add information to the resulting scores. As Cx/P(Cx) ap-
proaches the total number of nodes, the score generated by
event x drops to zero because the event fails to distinguish
between individuals. This, however, is a feature of events,
and is unlikely to be influenced by attacker behaviour. The
attacker can only avoid detection with certainty by adopt-
ing behaviour that generates identical events to the rest of
the population; from the defender’s perspective the objec-
tive is to ensure that the events are sufficiently comprehen-
sive to force insiders to either adopt compliant behaviour, or
be identified as potentially malicious.
From the perspective of network analysis there are a
number of practical considerations that are subject to on-
going study. The first implementation decision is which real
components are regarded as ’nodes’: should nodes model
all network components, just routing components and end-
points, or just endpoints such as clients, servers or users?
To date, only endpoint nodes have been considered; this de-
cision is based on the prior probability of network compo-
nents originating attacks, and the convenience in associating
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events with their possible sources. Further practical work is
also needed to relate the three event parameters to actual in-
trusion sensors and networks.
A key practical issue is how to determine which nodes
are a potential source of any particular event, and to what de-
gree. Ideally this assessment would be evidence-based using
recent network history, but although this is feasible in prin-
ciple, it is an open question if this can be achieved in prac-
tice. However, even simple strategies, such as the one used
in section 8.1, provide demonstrable benefit.
10 Conclusion
This paper provides a solution to a critical problem in in-
sider attacker discovery: how to combine events from multi-
ple sensors, and manage the data explosion that is otherwise
needed to support the identification of long-running attacks.
The key concept is to move away from maintaining mod-
els of the behaviour or sequencing of individual attacks, since
this in principle requires a hypothesis to be initiated for each
event. This is the process underlying existing Intrusion De-
tection Systems which provides an effective response to at-
tacks that can be detected over short periods of time but is
limited by scalability in identifying attacks developed over
a long period.
Instead, we propose to incrementally assess if every node
or individual in the system is an attacker. This approach is
extremely scalable; the updating algorithm is soundly based
in Bayesian statistics and avoids the need for global updating
after each event. The approach is well behaved in the sense
that higher certainty or volumes of attack make detection
faster, and in a worked example which includes several of
the difficulties faced in practice it significantly outperforms
counting algorithms (see section 8.1).
In addition, this work identifies the attributes or param-
eters that need to be standardized for disparate sources of
security event to be combined, allowing the use of a wide
range of different sources at different levels of abstraction.
We provide criteria for event attributes that must be met for
an event to add information rather than confusion: the ratio
of the number of nodes or individuals that may have orig-
inated the event, compared to the size of the system (see
section 7).
The process developed here is expected to be applicable
to behavioral information, as well as network-derived statis-
tics, based on evidence that events such as rule-breaking and
security violations are significant in the history of insiders
who eventually prove malicious. However, to confirm that
data-analytic approaches are able to allow the identification
of such insiders it is first necessary to establish the back-
ground rates of these events in populations of interest.
Research on this approach is ongoing, both using sim-
ulation and relating the work to real situations. The updat-
ing process described in this paper reflects a change of base
hypothesis from our earlier publications, and resolves some
of the open questions and marginal discrimination observed
previously; some remaining open questions are described in
section 9.
References
Bace R, Mell P (2001) Intrusion detection systems (IDS).
Tech. Rep. SP 800-31, National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST)
Band SR, Cappelli DM, Fischer LF, Moore AP, Shaw ED,
Trzeciak RF (2006) Comparing insider it sabotage and
espionage: A model-based analysis. Tech. rep., Carnegie
Mellon Software Engineering Institute
Brackney RC, Anderson RH (2004) Understanding the in-
sider threat. Tech. Rep. Proceedings of March 2004 Work-
shop, RAND National Security Research Division
Bradford PG, Brown M, Perdue J, Self B (2004) To-
wards proactive computer-system forensics. In: Interna-
tional Conference on Information Technology: Coding
and Computing (ITCC 2004), IEEE Computer Society, pp
648 – 652
Buford JF, Lewis L, Jakobson G (2008) Insider threat
detection using situation-aware MAS. In: 11th Interna-
tional Conference on Information Fusion, IEEE Xplore,
Cologne, Germany, pp 1–8
Caputo DD, Stephens GD, Maloof MA (2009) Detecting
insider theft of trade secrets. IEEE Security & Privacy
7(6):14–21
CERT Incident Note (1998) IN-98-05: Probes with spoofed
IP addresses
Chebrolua S, Abrahama A, Thomas JP (2004) Feature de-
duction and ensemble design of intrusion detection sys-
tems. Computers and Security 24(4):295–307
Chivers H, Nobles P, Shaikh SA, Clark JA, Chen H (2009)
Accumulating evidence of insider attacks. In: The 1st
International Workshop on Managing Insider Security
Threats (MIST 2009) (In Conjunction with IFIPTM
2009), CEUR Workshop Proceedings
Colombe JB, Stephens G (2004) Statistical profiling and vi-
sualization for detection of malicious insider attacks on
computer networks. In: The 2004 ACM Workshop on Vi-
sualization and Data Mining for Computer Security, ACM
Press, pp 138–142
Eberle W, Holder L (2009) Insider threat detection us-
ing graph-based approaches. In: Cybersecurity Applica-
tions & Technology Conference For Homeland Security
(CATCH), IEEE Computer Society, pp 237–241
Goodin D (2007) TJX breach was twice as big as admitted,
banks say. The Register
16
Heberlein T (2002) Tactical operations and strategic intel-
ligence: Sensor purpose and placement. Tech. Rep. TR-
2002-04.02, Net Squared, Inc.
Herbig KL, Wiskoff MF (2002) Espionage against the
united states by american citizens 1947-2001. Tech.
Rep. 02-05, Defense Personnel Security Research Center
(PERSEREC)
Nguyen N, Reiher P, Kuenning GH (2003) Detecting insider
threats by monitoring system call activity. In: 2003 IEEE
Workshop on Information Assurance, IEEE Computer
Society, United States Military Academy, West Point, pp
18–20
Randazzo MR, Cappelli D, Keeney M, Moore A, Kowal-
ski E (2004) U.S. secret service and CERT coordination
center/SEI insider threat study: Illicit cyber activity in the
banking and finance sector. Tech. rep., Software Engi-
neering Institute, Carnegie Mellon University
Russell S, Norvig P (2010) Artificial Intelligence, 3rd edn.
Prentice Hall
Spitzner L (2003) Honeypots: Catching the insider threat.
In: 19th Annual Computer Security Applications Confer-
ence (ACSAC ’03), IEE Computer Society, pp 170–179
Staniford S, Hoagland JA, McAlerney JM (2002) Practi-
cal automated detection of stealthy portscans. Journal of
Computer Security 10(1/2):105–136
Wells JT (2008) Principles of Fraud Examination, 2nd edn.
John Wiley & Sons
Howard Chivers is Professor of Information Systems and
Director of the Centre for Forensic Computing and Security
at Cranfield University, within the Defence Academy of the
United Kingdom. His research interests are in system secu-
rity and computer forensics, and current security projects in-
clude risk management in dynamic collaborative networks,
the identification of subtle intrusions within computer net-
works, and the security of industrial GRID applications. He
is also a security practitioner, providing security advice and
methodology for various projects, including air traffic man-
agement within the EEC. His previous career includes time
in Industry, developing cryptographic products, and Govern-
ment, managing the computer security research program of
the UK National Authority for Information Security.
John A. Clark is Professor of Critical Systems at the Uni-
versity of York. His work is focussed on software engineer-
ing (particularly testing) and secure systems engineering. He
has adopted techniques inspired by natural systems to ad-
dress problems including automated testing of implementa-
tions against formal specifications, automated secure proto-
col synthesis, the design of cryptographic components, crypt-
analysis, and most recently the use of genetic programming
to evolve quantum circuitry. Before joining York in 1992 he
worked on UK Government-funded evaluation and R&D se-
curity projects, and he has provided consultancy to industry
on various aspects of dependability modelling.
Philip Nobles is a lecturer within the Centre for Forensic
Computing and Security at Cranfield University; his teach-
ing and research interests include information security, wire-
less networks and cyberwarfare. He has led research projects
sponsored by Government, Research Councils and industry,
including the development of award-winning wireless cam-
eras for the BBC, a recent study on critical national infras-
tructure security for CPNI, and a TSB project on the Man-
agement of the Complexity, Risk and Resilience of Secure
Information Infrastructure. He has contributed to interna-
tional standards, and been interviewed on international me-
dia, including BBC TV, as an expert on cybercrime, network
and internet security.
Siraj A. Shaikh is a Research Fellow at the Department of
Informatics and Sensors, Cranfield University, UK. Prior to
this, he was a Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the United
Nations University-International Institute of Software Tech-
nology (UNU-IIST), Macau SAR China. His current research
interests include information and network security, in par-
ticular intrusion detection. He is a Chartered Member of the
British Computer Society (MBCS).
Hao Chen is a Research Associate at the University of York,
UK. He received his PhD in Computer Science from the
University of York in 2007. His research interests are in
computer and network security, cryptographic protocol, dig-
ital signature and non-repudiation, secure electronic com-
merce, as well as the application of modern heuristic search
techniques in network security areas. He has published over
10 referred research papers at international conferences and
journals. He is currently working on an EPSRC-funded
project on System-Smart Intrusion Detection.
